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Rape	 myths	 are	 widely	 held	 but	 false	 beliefs	 about	 rape,	 the	 nature	 of	 it,	 and	 the	
circumstances	 surrounding	 it.	 They	 have	 been	 described	 as	 “prejudicial,	 stereotyped,	 or	
false	beliefs	about	rape,	rape	victims,	and	rapists”	 (Burt,	1980,	p.	217).	 It	has	been	widely	
recognized	that	false	assumptions	about	rape	and	sexual	assault	are	dangerous	in	the	legal	
context	 as	 they	have	 the	potential	 to	 influence	decision-making	 (Ellison	&	Munro,	 2009a;	
Judicial	 Studies	 Board	 [JSB],	 2010;	 Temkin	 &	 Krahé,	 2008).	 Although	 Reece	 (2013)	 has	
recently	 criticized	 this	 view,	 her	 argument	 has	 been	 robustly	 challenged	 (Conaghan	 &	
Russell,	 2014).	 The	purpose	of	 the	 research	on	which	 this	article	 is	based	was	 to	 find	out	
whether	the	use	of	rape	mythology	could	still	be	found	in	modern	rape	trials	and,	if	so,	to	
examine	the	nature	of	its	use	and	attempts	made	by	trial	participants	to	combat	it.	
The	 academic	 study	 of	 rape	 myths	 has	 a	 long	 history	 (e.g.,	 Burt,	 1980),	 but	 a	 recent	
definition	 emphasizes	 both	 the	 content	 and	 function	 of	 these	 myths:	 “descriptive	 or	
prescriptive	 beliefs	 about	 sexual	 aggression	 (i.e.,	 about	 its	 scope,	 causes,	 context,	 and	
consequences)	that	serve	to	deny,	downplay	or	justify	sexually	aggressive	behavior	that	men	
commit	 against	 women”	 (Gerger,	 Kley,	 Bohner,	 &	 Siebler,	 2007,	 p.	 423).	 Examples	 include	
beliefs	that	the	only	genuine	rape	is	violent	rape	by	a	complete	stranger,	that	complaints	of	
rape	 are	 generally	 false,	 and	 that	 true	 victims	 report	 to	 the	police	 immediately.	Of	 course,	
some	 rapes	 are	 committed	by	 strangers	 and	do	 involve	 violence,	 some	 reports	of	 rape	are	
false,	 and	 some	 victims	 do	 report	 to	 the	 police	 immediately.	 However,	 myths	 involve	
generalizations	about	all	 rapes	and	therein	 lies	the	problem.	To	those	who	believe	 in	them,	
few	allegations	will	ever	qualify	as	real	rape.	





wide	 range	 of	 rape	 myths.	 They	 were	 used	 to	 undermine	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	
complainant,	 to	 blame	 her	 for	 the	 assault,	 and	 to	 make	 her	 appear	 unworthy	 of	 the	
protection	 of	 the	 law.	 Subsequently,	 legislative	 changes	 were	 introduced,	 which	 were	
designed	 to	 afford	 complainants	 more	 protection	 from	 questioning	 about	 their	 sexual	
history	 (s.41	 Youth	 Justice	 and	 Criminal	 Evidence	 Act	 1999	 (henceforth	 s.41)	 and	 “bad	
character”	 (s.100	 Criminal	 Justice	 Act	 [CJA],	 2003).	 The	 definitions	 of	 rape	 and	 consent	
were	 also	 revised	 (Sexual	 Offences	 Act	 [SOA],	 2003).	 S.41	 requires	 that	 a	 written	
application	 be	 made	 to	 the	 judge	 before	 evidence	 can	 be	 admitted	 about	 the	
complainant’s	 past	 sexual	 history.	 This	 must	 specify	 precisely	 the	 aspects	 of	 the	
complainant’s	 sexual	 history	 it	 is	 sought	 to	 explore	 and	 the	 grounds	 for	 doing	 so.	 The	
judge	may	approve	the	application	only	in	a	very	restricted	set	of	circumstances	set	out	in	
the	 legislation	 (see	Kelly,	Temkin	&	Griffiths,	2006	 for	 further	details).	Kelly	et	al.	 (2006)	
examined	the	operation	of	s.41,	and	concluded	that	sexual	history	evidence	was	still	being	










relying	 on	 pre-existing	 beliefs	 about	 rape	 are	 likely	 to	 encourage	 quicker	 and	 less	 effortful	
heuristic	 processing	 (Chaiken,	 1980;	 Temkin	 &	 Krahé,	 2008).	 Moreover,	 regardless	 of	 the	
depth	of	processing	employed,	jurors	may	selectively	process	the	evidence	in	line	with	their	
pre-existing	beliefs	 about	 rape	 (Chaiken,	Giner-Sorolla,	&	Chen,	 1996).	 Thus,	when	defense	
counsel	(DC)	employ	rape	myths,	they	are	reinforcing	the	beliefs	of	those	who	believe	in	those	
myths,	while	also	potentially	raising	doubt	in	the	minds	of	those	who	generally	do	not.	
Rape	 myths	 have	 a	 notable	 effect	 on	 mock	 jury	 discussions	 of	 rape	 cases	 (Ellison	 &	
Munro,	2009a).	They	can	also	obstruct	attempts	to	educate	mock	jurors	as	to	the	reality	of	
rape	(Ellison	&	Munro,	2009b).	Research	has	shown	that	those	who	believe	in	rape	myths	









complainant’s	 sexual	 history	 and	 to	 “allegations	 about	 the	 character	 or	 demeanour	 of	 the	
victim	which	are	irrelevant	to	the	issues	in	the	case”	(CPS,	2012,	p.	34).	Efforts	to	improve	the	




the	 report	 by	 Angiolini	 (2015)	 suggest	 that	 this	 training	 has	 not	 been	 adequately	














The	 study	 employed	 an	 observational	 design	 together	 with	 qualitative	 semi-structured	
interviews	with	some	of	the	barristers	appearing	in	the	observed	cases.	This	article	focuses	
on	the	trial	observations,	with	the	main	analysis	of	the	interviews	to	be	reported	elsewhere.	
Official	 recordings	 are	made	 of	 trials	 conducted	 in	 the	 courts	 of	 England	 and	Wales	 but	















































The	 study	 sample	 consisted	of	alleged	 rapes	by	one	 stranger,	 three	acquaintances,	one	
husband,	and	 three	previous	partners.	 The	 term	 stranger	 has	been	used	where	 there	has	
been	 no	 previous	 interaction	 of	 any	 sort	 between	 complainant	 and	 defendant.	





throughout	seven	of	 the	 trials,	and	then	typed	up	during	 trial	breaks	and	at	 the	end	of	 the	
day.	In	Trial	1,	the	second	and	third	authors	conducted	the	observation	and	separately	took	
















trials,	 and	 if	 so	 which	 myths	 were	 present.	 Identifying	 rape	 myth	 usage	 is	 not	
unproblematic.	DC	has	 a	 duty	 to	 represent	 the	defendant	 and	 to	put	 forward	his	 case	 as	
strongly	 as	 possible,	 which	 can	 frequently	 entail	 a	 robust	 cross-examination	 of	 the	
complainant.	A	conservative	approach	toward	the	identification	of	myth	use	was	adopted,	
















The	 study	 found	 that	 myth	 use	 was	 frequent.	 Across	 the	 course	 of	 the	 eight	 trials,	 the	
defense	had	recourse	 to	a	 remarkably	wide	 range	of	myths	as	 is	 illustrated	 in	Table	2.	All	
have	been	previously	identified	in	the	literature	of	rape	mythology	(e.g.,	Payne,	Lonsway,	&	
Fitzgerald,	 1999;	 Temkin	 &	 Krahé,	 2008).	 The	 myths	 were	 used	 in	 subtly	 different,	 if	
overlapping,	ways	and,	as	mentioned	above,	three	themes	were	identified.	In	Theme	1,	DC	
draws	 on	 the	 stereotype	 of	 what	 happens	 before,	 during,	 and	 after	 a	 “real	 rape,”	
highlighting	 the	 elements	 of	 it	 that	 are	missing	 in	 the	 case	 in	 question,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
casting	doubt	on	the	prosecution’s	allegations.	In	Theme	2,	rape	myths	are	used	to	discredit	
the	 complainant,	 focusing	 on	 her	 character	 and	 background.	 In	 Theme	 3,	 rape	 myths	
relating	to	the	specific	facts	of	the	case	are	mobilized.	
Theme	1:	 The	 “real	 rape”	 stereotype	as	 the	 standard.	The	 classic	 stereotype	of	 a	 genuine	
rape	is	a	violent	sexual	attack	by	a	stranger	(Temkin	&	Krahé,	2008),	where	the	victim	does	
all	 she	 can	 to	 resist,	 incurring	 injury	 and/or	 torn	 clothes	 in	 the	 process,	 and	 immediately	
reporting	 the	 matter	 to	 the	 police.	 In	 Theme	 1,	 DC	 invokes	 this	 stereotype	 and	 then	
attempts	to	distance	the	case	 in	hand	from	it	by	pointing	to	the	relationship	between	the	
parties,	 however	 tenuous,	 and	 emphasizing	 the	 absence	 of	 injuries,		
	
Table	2.	A	“Map”	of	Defense	Myths	and	Judicial	Directions,	by	Trial.	
	 Trial	1	 Trial	2	 Trial	3	 Trial	4	 Trial	5	 Trial	6	 Trial	7	 Trial	8	
No.	of	myths	used	by	
defense	
3	 4	 6	 6	 5	 7	 6	 1	
Lack	of	injury/torn	
clothes	
	 !	 	 	 !	 !
a
	 	 	
Failure	to	resist	 	 	 !
a










	 	 	 	
Rape	complainants	
are	commonly	liars	
!	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 !	 	






















	 	 !	 	 	 	 	 	







	 	 	 	 	 !
a
	 	 	






!	 	 	 	 !
a










physical	 injury	 (Bowyer	 &	 Dalton,	 1997;	 Sugar,	 Fine,	 &	 Eckert,	 2004).	 Yet	 these	 myths	
featured	strongly	in	two	of	the	eight	trials	(5	and	6)	and	were	also	present	in	Trial	2.	In	Trial	




injuries	 at	 all,	 no	 red	 marks.”	 Thus,	 DC	 was	 relying	 on	 the	 false	 idea	 that	 any	 force	
necessarily	entails	injury	and	that	without	force	or	injury	real	rape	has	not	occurred.	












going	 to	 kill	 her	 and	 her	 strategy	 was	 to	 go	 along	 with	 what	 he	 wanted.	 In	 her	 closing	





ONS,	 2013).	 Some	 are	 reluctant	 to	 mention	 the	 matter	 to	 anybody	 (Stewart,	 Dobbin,	 &	
Gatowski,	1996).	The	myth	that	genuine	rape	victims	will	 report	 immediately	was	 invoked	
particularly	 in	 two	 trials	 (3	 and	 5).	 In	 Trial	 3	 there	was	 some	 delay	 before	 C	 reported	 to	
		 8	
anyone	that	she	had	been	repeatedly	raped	by	her	husband.	DC	cross-examined	C	and	two	
witnesses	at	great	 length	about	 this,	 implying	 that	genuine	victims	 report	 immediately.	 In	
her	closing	speech	DC	claimed	that	the	delay	suggested	C	was	lying.	
Even	 in	 an	adversarial	 system,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 justify	 the	use	of	 Theme	1	mythology.	Cross-
examination	 about	 the	 absence	of	 features	 consistent	with	 the	 stereotype	of	 a	 “real	 rape”	
serves	no	other	purpose	than	to	mislead	the	jury.	DC	utilizes	these	ideas	to	encourage	the	jury	









has	 had	 occasion	 to	 prosecute	 very	 few	 complainants	 for	 making	 false	 allegations	 (CPS,	





Unfortunately,	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 courts	 is	 that	 false	 allegations	 of	 this	 type	 are	
made,	sadly	regularly	made,	and	are	made	for	all	sorts	of	reasons.	Allegations	are	quite	
easy	to	make:	You	only	have	to	say	it	and	it	has	to	be	investigated.	
This	 theme	 was	 even	 taken	 up	 by	 the	 judge	 in	 the	 case,	 who	 reiterated	 that	 “sexual	
allegations	are	easy	to	make	but	difficult	to	refute.”	It	is	well	established	today	that	rape	is	a	
very	difficult	allegation	 to	make	and,	as	noted	above,	most	 rapes	are	not	 reported	 to	 the	
police	 (MJ,	 HO,	 &	 ONS,	 2013).	 Contrary	 to	 the	 adage,	 as	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 is	 on	 the	




In	 Trial	 1,	 involving	 attempted	 rape	 by	 a	 complete	 stranger,	 the	 prosecution	 had	 a	 very	
strong	 case	 as,	 unusually,	 the	 incident	 had	 been	 directly	 observed	 by	 two	 excellent	
independent	witnesses.	Arguing	that	the	witnesses	were	mistaken	and	that	C	was	lying	about	
what	 had	 happened,	 DC	 successfully	 applied	 to	 the	 judge	 to	 cross-examine	 C	 about	 her	
alleged	bad	 character	 (s.100	CJA).	A	 very	 lengthy	 cross-examination	ensued	 taking	 in	 every	
aspect	of	C’s	past.	C,	it	was	claimed,	was	a	violent	drunk,	a	woman	of	bad	character	who	had	
made	 previous	 rape	 allegations	 and	 whose	 word	 about	 what	 had	 happened	 could	 not	
therefore	 be	 trusted.	While	DC	 could	 not	 be	 faulted	 for	 attempting	 to	 do	 the	 best	 for	 her	












home	 and	made	 his	way	 into	 her	 house	where	 he	 allegedly	 raped	 her.	 DC	 described	 the	
alleged	rape	as	“a	slightly	embarrassing	sexual	encounter	portrayed	as	rape.”	He	suggested	
to	 C,	 “You	 behaved	 a	 little	 out	 of	 character	 after	 having	 a	 few	 drinks	 and	 were	 a	 bit	












The	 judge	 commented	 to	 the	 researcher	 after	 the	 trial	was	 adjourned	 that	 the	 defense	was	
doing	its	utmost	to	have	C’s	previous	sexual	relationships	brought	out	in	court	and	he	was	not	












In	 Trial	 6,	 C	 alleged	 that	 she	 had	 been	 raped	 by	 a	 former	 partner	 with	 whom	 she	 had	
previously	had	an	on/off	relationship.	In	her	video-recorded	police	interview,	C	had	described	
the	 sexual	 nature	 of	 this	 relationship.	 The	 judge	 decided	 that,	 as	 the	 jury	 would	 see	 this	
interview,	 there	 was	 no	 need	 for	 a	 s.41	 application	 which	 would,	 in	 any	 case,	 have	 been	
successful.	However,	 in	addition	to	exploring	in	depth	C’s	relationship	with	D,	DC,	 in	blatant	
contravention	of	s.41,	questioned	her	about	her	relationships	with	other	men	when	she	was	
not	 seeing	 D.	 Instead	 of	 cutting	 off	 this	 line	 of	 cross-examination,	 remarkably,	 the	 judge	
himself	 questioned	 her	 about	 this	 matter,	 reiterating	 to	 the	 court	 that	 she	 had	 had	 a	
relationship	 with	 someone	 else	 during	 one	 of	 these	 “off	 periods.”	 Quite	 apart	 from	 the	
irrelevance	 and	highly	 prejudicial	 nature	 of	 this	 questioning	 about	 sex	with	 third	 parties,	 it	
should	not	have	been	permitted	outside	a	s.41	application.	
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Again,	 in	 Trial	 7,	 C	 had	 been	 asked	 in	 her	 police	 interview	 about	 her	 previous	 sexual	
experience	with	others.	As	a	result,	her	sexual	history	was	revealed	when	the	video	recording	
of	the	interview	(see	Achieving	Best	Evidence,	MJ,	2011),	was	shown	unedited	in	court.	In	the	
absence	 of	 any	 s.41	 application,	 both	 prosecution	 and	 defense	 then	 referred	 to	 C’s	 sexual	










and	sexual	abuse.	The	 judge	decided	that	 there	was	no	evidence	that	 these	allegations	were	
false.	He	gave	permission	for	one	question	only	to	be	asked	about	them	in	relation	to	a	panic	
attack	 that	C	had	 suffered	after	 the	alleged	 rape.	However,	DC	managed	 to	 refer	5	 times	 to	
these	 previous	 allegations	 of	 sexual	 assault.	 In	 her	 closing	 speech,	 she	 reminded	 the	 jury	 at	




history.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 study	 by	 Kelly	 et	 al.	 (2006),	 which	 demonstrated	 flaws	 in	 the	
operation	of	s.41,	steps	were	taken	to	tighten	procedures	and	to	require	written	applications	
pre-trial	(see	MJ,	Criminal	Procedure	Rules,	Part	36).	But	the	present	small	study	suggests	that	









of	 stereotypes.	 It	 goes	without	 saying	 that	 counsel	 cannot	 be	 criticized	 for	 discussing	 the	
facts	 of	 the	 case,	 for	 example,	 that	 C	 and	D	were	married,	were	 former	partners,	 or	 had	
engaged	 in	 kissing	 before	 the	 event	 in	 question.	 The	 fault	 lies	 in	 invoking	 false	 ideas	 in	
relation	to	those	facts	and	inviting	false	conclusions	from	them.	
A	prevalent	myth	drawn	on	by	DC	in	four	of	these	trials	(2,	3,	4,	and	6)	was	that	marital	
rape,	 rape	 by	 a	 former	 partner,	 or	 rape	 by	 someone	 with	 whom	 C	 has	 previously	 had	
consensual	sex	is	not	really	rape,	and	if	consent	was	absent	on	a	particular	occasion,	there	is	
no	 real	 harm	done.	 Contrary	 to	 this	myth,	 the	 harm	of	 rape	 by	 previous	 partners	 is	well	
established	(see,	for	example,	Coker,	Weston,	Creson,	Justice,	&	Blakeney,	2005).	In	Trial	3,	
C	was	allegedly	 raped	by	her	husband.	During	 the	 trial,	DC	 repeatedly	emphasized	 that	D	
and	C	were	married,	referring	to	the	“marital	bed,”	“marital	relations,”	“marital	bedroom,”	









immediately	 depart	 the	 marital	 home	 never	 to	 return	 or,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 abandon	 the	
marital	bedroom	until	such	time	as	she	could	secure	her	departure.	Many	women	who	have	
experienced	intimate	partner	(sexual)	violence	are	asked	why	they	do	not	leave	the	abusive	
relationship	 (Murray,	 2008;	 Rhodes	 &	McKenzie,	 1998).	 The	 factors	 associated	with	 either	
staying	or	 leaving	are	numerous	and	complex	(see	Rhodes	&	McKenzie,	1998,	for	a	review).	
Indeed,	 Carline	 and	 Easteal	 (2014)	 emphasized	 that	 multiple	 forms	 of	 coercion	 may	 be	
brought	 to	 bear	 in	 abusive	 relationships,	 which	 restrict	 women’s	 choices.	 In	 Trial	 3,	 C,	 an	
asylum	seeker,	was	cross-examined	repeatedly	in	five	different	threads	of	questioning	about	





about	 rape.	 It	 furthermore	 fails	 to	acknowledge	 the	difficulties	 that	 face	 immigrant	women	
who	may	 well	 face	 deportation	 if	 they	 leave	 their	 husbands	 and	 are	 therefore	 effectively	
trapped	in	abusive	relationships	(Carline	&	Easteal,	2014).	
A	 further	myth	 seen	 in	 these	 trials	 denies	 any	distinction	between	 consenting	 to	 some	
intimate	behavior	and	consenting	to	sex	(Gray,	2015;	Payne	et	al.,	1999).	In	three	trials	(4,	5,	
and	7),	DC	emphasized	that	C	had	consented	to	some	kissing.	There	is	every	reason	for	DC	
to	have	cross-examined	C	about	consensual	 kissing	 in	 these	 trials	but	 there	was	a	 further	
implication	that	consent	to	kissing	effectively	meant	consent	to	sex	or	that	C	rather	than	D	
was	to	blame	for	what	happened	thereafter.	






led	 to	 other	 things,”	 kissing	meant	 that	 she	 consented	 to	 sex	 as	well.	 PC,	 conceding	 that	
kissing	was	a	mistake	on	C’s	part,	dealt	with	this	implication	robustly:	“Even	if	she	had	a	kiss	
that	did	not	mean	that	she	wanted	full	sex	and	oral	sex.”	
Rape	 myths	 contain	 rigid	 prescriptions	 as	 to	 post-rape	 behavior.	 Genuine	 victims	 are	
expected	 to	 do	 all	 they	 can	 to	 escape	 from	 their	 attacker,	 to	 preserve	 the	 evidence	 as	 a	
prelude	 to	 reporting	 the	matter	 to	 the	 police,	 and	 to	 exhibit	 appropriate	 emotion	 when	
reporting	 the	matter	 and	 in	 court;	 but	 the	 trauma	 of	 the	 event	may	 affect	 individuals	 in	
different	ways	(e.g.,	Foa	&	Rothbaum,	1998).	Despite	this,	post-rape	behavior	came	under	
scrutiny	 in	 four	 trials	 (1,	5,	6,	and	7).	 In	Trial	6,	 for	example,	C	showered	and	washed	the	
sheets	after	 the	alleged	 rape.	DC	declared	 that	 this	was	 inconsistent	with	 the	behavior	of	
someone	who	had	been	sexually	assaulted	as	she	was	effectively	getting	rid	of	the	evidence.	
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In	 Trial	 7,	 DC	 drew	 the	 jury’s	 attention	 to	 C’s	 demeanor	 in	 court;	 rather	 than	 showing	
distress,	 she	was	 “feisty”	 and	 responded	with	 “fiery	 irritation”	 to	 questions	 put	 to	 her	 in	
cross-examination.	The	jury	was	asked	to	consider	whether	this	was	the	type	of	woman	who	







et	 al.,	 1999).	 It	 featured	 strongly	 in	 Trial	 6,	 in	 which	 C	 was	 allegedly	 raped	 by	 a	 former	








The	 final	 myth	 identified	 in	 these	 trials	 focuses	 on	 the	 defendant,	 and	 suggests	 that	
rapists	are	 identifiable	because	they	are	“other,”	different	 from	normal	men	and	not	“the	
man	 next	 door.”	 However,	 most	 perpetrators	 are	 known	 to	 the	 victim	 (MJ,	 HO,	 &	 ONS,	
2013),	and	not	noticeably	“different”	from	other	men.	This	myth	cropped	up	in	two	trials	(4	
and	 7).	 In	 Trial	 4,	 the	 idea	 that	 sex	 offenders	 are	 “other”	was	 a	 convenient	myth	 for	 DC	
when	defending	a	seemingly	respectable	man.	D	had	been	in	the	army	for	many	years	and	
was	employed	as	a	part-time	teacher.	There	were	in	all	13	separate	references	to	D’s	good	










In	 Theme	3,	myths	 associated	with	 the	particular	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 are	operationalized.	
There	may	 well	 be	 good	 reason	 to	 cross-examine	 C	 about	 the	 facts	 in	 question	 but	 this	
becomes	 problematic	 when	 the	 jury	 is,	 through	 repeated	 questioning	 and	 suggestion,	
invited	 to	 fall	 back	 on	 the	 stereotypes	 and	 conclude	 that	 these	 facts	 lead	 to	 the	
mythological	conclusion.	
Challenging	the	Stereotypes	






false	allegation	motivated	by	a	desire	 to	get	close	to	a	male	 friend,	she	retorted,	 “The	 idea	




above,	 the	 defense	 in	 this	 case	 had	much	 to	 say	 about	 C’s	 night	 attire.	 PC	 in	 her	 closing	
speech	directly	and	skillfully	addressed	this	issue:	
Rape	does	not	always	 involve	 somebody	being	dragged	off	 the	street	 into	 the	bushes.	
Rapes	 happen	 in	 relationships;	 they	 are	 committed	 by	 people	 you	 trust.	 Was	 C	 not	
entitled	to	trust	this	person	with	whom	she	had	been	in	a	relationship	for	6	years?	She	









In	 these	 trials,	 there	 are	 a	 few	 instances	 of	 well-constructed	 challenges	 to	 rape	 myths.	





the	 eight	 trials	meant	 there	was	 ample	 opportunity	 for	 judges	 to	 tackle	 some	 of	 them	 by	
intervening	where	cross-examination	of	C	became	oppressive	or	 irrelevant	and	 in	 their	 jury	
directions.	Myth-related	judicial	interventions	were	rare.	But	in	Trial	7,	DC,	invoking	the	myth	





The	 Crown	 Court	 Bench	 Book
4




is	 likely	 to	have	consented;	 rape	 takes	place	between	strangers;	 rape	does	not	 take	place	
without	 physical	 resistance	 from	 the	 victim;	 if	 it	 is	 rape,	 there	must	 be	 injuries;	 a	 person	




for	 judges	 to	 use	 if	 they	 so	 choose	when	 directing	 the	 jury	 to	 correct	 the	 listed	mistaken	




evidence,”	 “late	 reporting,”	 “absence	 of	 force	 or	 the	 threat	 of	 force,”	 “some	 consensual	
activity—no	 overt	 force—lack	 of	 resistance”	 (including	 lack	 of	 injury),	 “provocative	 dress—









In	 Trial	 3,	 six	 myths	 were	 utilized	 by	 the	 defense.	 The	 judge	 used	 the	 three	 available	
Illustrations—“avoiding	 assumptions	 when	 the	 complainant	 and	 defendant	 are	 known	 to	








and	 funds	 to	 live	off.	 In	 this	case,	delay	was	a	material	 consideration	 that	 the	 jury	had	 to	
think	about.	
In	Trial	4,	 six	myths	were	utilized	by	 the	defense.	There	were	15	 references	 to	 the	 fact	
that	 D	 and	 C	 were	 former	 partners,	 much	 was	 made	 of	 D’s	 army	 background	 and	 good	

















In	 Trial	 6,	 seven	 myths	 were	 invoked.	 There	 were	 three	 relevant	 Illustrations:	 those	
concerning	“avoiding	assumptions	when	the	complainant	and	defendant	are	known	to	one	
another,”	“provocative	dress,”	and	“lack	of	 injury.”	The	 judge	made	reference	 to	all	 three	
albeit	very	briefly.	Before	doing	so,	he	repeated	Hale’s	notorious	dictum:	“Sexual	allegations	
are	easy	allegations	to	make	but	difficult	to	refute.”	As	to	C’s	lack	of	undergarments	in	bed,	
which	 the	 defense	 had	 heavily	 emphasized,	 he	 commented	 that	 if	 it	 was	 the	 automatic	
assumption	of	a	man	that	it	was	“game	on”	if	she	was	in	bed	with	no	knickers,	then	it	would	
also	be	the	assumption	of	a	mature	woman.	In	other	words,	the	judge	was	suggesting	that	C	
either	knew	 that	D	would	 think	 she	was	 consenting	or	 should	have	 known.	 If	 she	did	not	
actually	consent,	she	was	to	blame	for	what	happened.	But	he	added	that	the	jury	had	to	be	




of	person	may	be	a	 rapist,”	 “demeanor	 in	 court,”	 “sexual	history,”	and	“some	consensual	






















The	 list	of	myths	mentioned	 in	 the	Bench	Book	 is	expressed	 to	be	non-exhaustive	 (JSB,	
2010).	 The	 judges	 in	 this	 study,	 for	 the	most	 part,	 chose	 not	 to	 stray	 beyond	 the	 list	 to	






defense	 and	 there	were	 19	 opportunities	 to	make	 use	 of	 an	 Illustration	 to	warn	 the	 jury	




stereotypes,	 in	 the	 remaining	 five	 trials,	 they	 were	 handled	 with	 considerably	 less	
assurance.	 It	 is	concerning	that	 in	Trial	4	where	the	defense	drew	heavily	upon	six	myths,	
the	 judge	chose	 to	 say	nothing	whatever	about	any	of	 them	and	 that	 in	Trial	6	 the	 judge	
solemnly	repeated	Hale’s	infamous	dictum.	It	is	also	less	than	reassuring	that	in	Trial	5	the	






	 it	 cannot	be	ascertained	with	any	degree	of	 certainty	how	much	 the	
rape	myths	mobilized	in	the	trials	influenced	the	verdicts,	how	much	the	challenges	to	them	
had	 any	 effect,	 or	 what	 the	 significance	 was	 of	 other	 variables.	 Certainly,	 in	 Trial	 1,	 the	
evidence	against	the	defendant	was	overwhelming	and	the	conviction	was	therefore	to	be	
expected	and,	in	Trial	3,	C	was	a	particularly	credible	witness.	It	has	been	argued	by	Bohner	
et	 al.	 (2009)	 that,	 as	 schemas,	 rape	myths	 are	 likely	 to	 provide	 an	 attitudinal	 scaffolding	
within	which	the	evidence	is	interpreted.	If	this	is	so,	it	follows	that	effective	challenges	to	
these	 myths	 may	 undermine	 that	 attitudinal	 scaffolding.	 In	 Trials	 3	 and	 7,	 the	 judges’	
excellent	directions	on	myths	may	therefore	have	had	some	impact	on	the	jury	and,	in	Trial	
7,	both	C	and	PC	also	challenged	the	myths	and	this	may	have	had	some	effect.	Conversely,	
in	 the	 cases	 where	 there	 was	 an	 acquittal,	 there	 were	 no	 effective	 directions	 from	 the	














observational	 study	 of	 practice	 in	 the	 courts,	 this	 study	 makes	 a	 novel	 contribution	 to	
understanding	the	way	in	which	rape	myths	are	used	and	challenged	in	the	“real	world.”	Its	
originality	 lies	 in	 its	 delineation	 of	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 myths	 are	 deployed	 to	




observational	 research,	 both	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 in	 other	 jurisdictions	 with	
		 17	
adversarial	 systems,	would	 be	 useful	 to	 generate	 quantitative	 data,	which	would	 provide	
stronger	 evidence	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 myths	 used	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
prosecution	 and	 judicial	 challenges	 to	 the	 myths.	 However,	 the	 finding	 that	 a	 wide	
repertoire	of	myths	was	pressed	into	service	by	the	defense	in	the	observed	trials—five	or	








It	 is	 disappointing	 that,	 on	 the	 whole,	 myth	 usage	 by	 the	 defense	 was	 insufficiently	
challenged	by	 the	prosecution	although	 there	were	a	 few	 instances	of	 counsel	 employing	
skillful	and	robust	counter-arguments.	Similarly,	while	several	judges	in	the	study	addressed	
the	myths	 very	 fairly	 and	 adeptly,	 others	 failed	 to	 give	 adequate	 or	 indeed	 any	 warning	
about	them	or	to	make	use	of	the	Illustrations.	
The	study	also	suggests	 that	s.41,	which	places	strict	 limits	on	the	use	of	sexual	history	
evidence	 in	 court,	 is	 still	 not	 doing	 the	 job	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 do.	 Moreover,	 if	 Trial	 1	 is	
anything	to	go	by,	s.100	may	also	not	be	providing	much	protection	for	complainants	from	
over-reaching	 cross-examination	 about	 their	 “bad	 character.”	 Given	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
adversarial	 system,	 it	 may	 be	 too	much	 to	 expect	 defense	 barristers	 to	 curb	 their	 ways.	
However,	at	 the	very	 least,	 they	must	be	held	to	account	 for	 flagrant	breaches	of	 the	 law	
such	as	in	England	and	Wales	when	s.41	is	ignored.	
All	 these	 findings	 suggest	 that	 further	 training	 for	 prosecutors	 and	 judges	 is	 necessary.	
The	 Angiolini	 review	 recommended	 that	 more	 training	 programs	 for	 prosecutors	 be	
introduced	urgently	 to	 enhance	 rape	myth	 recognition	 and	 it	 is	 suggested	here	 that	 such	
training	 should	be	 extended	 to	 all	 barristers	who	appear	 in	 sexual	 assault	 cases	 involving	
both	 adults	 and	 children.	 Training	 about	 rape	mythology	 could	 usefully	 take	 the	 form	 of	
encouraging	awareness	of	the	subtle	ways	 in	which	myths	are	 invoked	and	the	misleading	
assumptions	 that	 arise	 from	 them,	 as	 well	 as	 enabling	 prosecution	 counsel	 to	 develop	
effective	 counter-narratives	 to	 those	 employed	 by	 the	 defense.	 As	 noted	 above,	 there	 is	
some	excellent	prosecutorial	and	judicial	practice	in	this	area	that	could	be	put	to	good	use	
in	training	programs.	
It	 is	 disturbing	 that	 false	 ideas	 about	 rape	played	 such	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 these	 eight	
21st-century	trials.	If	the	adversarial	system	and	jury	trials	countenance	the	use	of	any	tricks	
or	 falsities	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 playing	 the	 game	 and	 defending	 the	 accused,	 then	 serious	
questions	must	be	 asked	about	 its	moral	 validity	 and	 the	extent	 to	which	 it	 is	 capable	of	
giving	 protection	 to	 victims.	 It	 is	 suggested	here	 that	 the	way	 forward	 lies	 in	 further	 and	
deeper	education	of	prosecuting	authorities	and	judges	about	rape	myths	and	their	malign	
effect.	 A	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 experts	 in	 this	 context	 would	 also	 be	 of	 value.	
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